Publication | Page 657 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

Iranian Nuclear Programme and Pakistan: Implications of the Linkages July 2004 Rajesh Kumar Mishra

Against all odds, Iran is pressing hard to prove its nuclear innocence and keeping its promises under the provisions of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is refusing to go along with Iran’s denials on violation of the NPT commitments. At the same time, the Bush Administration seems determined to stop the spread of nuclear weapons beyond Pakistan to other Muslim states. However, the facts emerging out of the probe into the A.Q. Khan episode and the international grey nuclear market indicate significant patterns of concealment and duplicity even by the NPT signatory states. This paper is an effort to analyse the implications of Pakistan’s linkages with the Iranian nuclear programme.

Nuclear and Arms Control Iran, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear, Pakistan Nepal: Quest for Elusive Peace July 2004 Sanjay K Jha

Amidst the continuously expanding sphere of Maoist influence, political uncertainties and growing international interest, Nepal continues to remain one of the most volatile countries in South Asia. Recent developments have, once again, reconfirmed that while the Maoists have been successful in gradually pushing their agenda through violence and intimidation, the four-party coalition government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba is increasingly finding it difficult to evolve a coherent strategy to counter it. In fact, ever since his reinstatement on June 2, 2004, Deuba has been trying to work out a framework to deal with the eight-year old insurgency, which has claimed approximately 10,000 lives. However, the limited success of counter-insurgency operations, the government’s inability to forge consensus on the peace process, the continued opposition by the Nepali Congress-led political front, the emerging differences within the government, the withdrawal/collapse of state institutions and a sustained Maoist offensive have made the government increasingly vulnerable and catapulted the Maoists into the political centrestage.

In this context, Deuba’s visit to India from September 8-12, 2004, was an attempt to strengthen his regime both politically and militarily. According to the joint statement issued on September 12, 2004, both the countries viewed the Maoist insurgency as a common threat and agreed to further intensify cooperation in curbing their activities. India reassured more assistance to Nepal’s security forces in addition to existing support in terms of arms, ammunition, helicopters, intelligence sharing and training. At the same time, India also reportedly pointed out that there is no military solution to the Maoist problem and the government should initiate a meaningful dialogue process. However, Deuba’s success on this front will be determined, to a great extent, by his ability to retain the legitimacy of his regime and strike a balance between the key players in Nepal’s politics - the King, the political parties and the Maoists.

The Maoists’ predominance in Nepali politics has been facilitated by the inability of successive governments in addressing the basic problems such as poverty, underdevelopment and discriminatory social order. A fractured polity, the absence of an elected government and continuous power struggle between the King and the major political parties have provided the Maoists with an opportunity to control approximately half of the territory. Besides, the near collapse of development work and civil governance in violence-affected areas, breakdown of the rule of law, and lack of democratisation at the grassroots level sustain the Maoist activities.

Consequently, the Maoists have not only set up parallel structures of governance in many parts of the country including their own visa and taxation system but have also been able to exert considerable influence in urban centres for example, the week-long blockade of the Kathmandu Valley imposed on August 18, 2004. Though the visible impact of the blockade was not significant because the Maoists ‘suspended it for one month’ on August 24, 2004, they were, nonetheless, able to gain significant psychological advantage particularly the capability to cut off links to the capital city at will. The deteriorating situation was further aggravated when the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) enforced indefinite closure of 47 industrial establishments, hotels and transport services to press for their demands, which include among others, making public the whereabouts of its workers and leaders who have allegedly disappeared from government custody, compensation to the families of those killed by the state, removal of the terrorist tag slapped on them and increased wages and facilities to workers. Though the ANTUF agreed to withdraw its call on September 15, 2004, after the government agreed to release two of its detained leaders and make available information on the whereabouts of people ‘disappeared’ from custody within one month beginning September 22, 2004, it is unlikely to restore the confidence of the business community due to continued threat of extortion and the government’s inability to provide protection to industries. Simultaneously, the Maoists continued with their violent campaign, attacking district headquarters, government infrastructure, security forces and civilian population. On September 10, 2004, the Maoists were reported to have exploded two bombs at the American Information Center at Gyaneshwar in Kathmandu. No one was injured in the incident after which the US government decided to suspend all Peace Corps activities.

The absence of a comprehensive counter-insurgency doctrine has enabled the Maoists to grow from strength to strength. The main thrust of counter-insurgency operations has been the excessive use of force and towards that end the government has worked on a policy of strengthening the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) with sophisticated weapons from India, the US, the UK, Belgium and other countries. It is estimated that approximately 25 per cent of the total national budget is now allocated to security. However, despite considerable augmentation of the strength of the RNA, the situation on the ground remains alarming. Though the security forces have achieved some success in counter-insurgency operations, the task is becoming difficult due to lack of adequate state presence in the violence-affected areas. As a result, the government has not been able to supplement the success of counter-insurgency in one area with strengthening/restoration of civil governance, institutions of law enforcement and democratic process. The experience of the counter-insurgency operation has, therefore, necessitated an assessment of the broad direction of government policy and implications of continuous strengthening of the RNA. There is an apprehension that while the continuation of this approach may not be able to contain the Maoists militarily, it might catapult the RNA into an important player in Nepali politics with its own stake. It might further strengthen the King and weaken the democratic government and its ability to pursue a meaningful peace process.

The impetus to the peace process is being reinforced by the realisation that there cannot be a purely military solution to the problem. The Maoists are in a stronger position as is evident from their tough stand on talks. Reports in the first week of September 2004 said, the Maoists have ruled out the possibility of dialogue with the Deuba government favouring instead direct negotiations with King Gyanendra and have reiterated their demand for a Constituent Assembly election under the aegis of the UN. It is clear that the present Maoist demand will further strengthen the King and reinforce the perception that the government is not in a position to play a decisive role. Consequently, the role of the monarchy becomes important. When King Gyanendra appointed Deuba in June 2004, he had spelt out three tasks before him: to take on board all major political parties on important national issues, find ways to deal with the Maoist insurgency and prepare the nation for elections. If Deuba fails to deliver on these counts, the King might be compelled to remove him from office. Given the fact that an extreme Right Wing opinion within the political spectrum wants the King to play a more active role, the success of the present government will depend largely on the King whose inflexible approach has thus far only complicated the problem.

The differences within the mainstream political formations have only added to the complications. While Deuba has been able to form a coalition government with the help of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPNUML), he has failed to evolve a consensus even within the ruling coalition on issues such as ceasefire, external mediation and elections to the Constituent Assembly. The UML reportedly favours unilateral ceasefire by the government as a prelude to the resumption of negotiations while Deuba insists that unless the Maoists show any sincere commitment towards a result oriented peace process; declaration of a unilateral ceasefire would be meaningless. On the question of the Constituent Assembly, the UML has hinted that the issue is not closed and could be addressed during the peace talks. In January 2004, the UML presented a nine-point roadmap favouring either amendments to the new Constitution or the preparation by the House of Representative. On the question of external mediation involving the UN, Deuba has rejected the idea on the ground that the issue was an internal one; the UML, on the other hand, incorporated a possible UN role in its nine-point roadmap. However, it has yet to expand on the type of role it envisages for the UN in the conflict.

Outside the government, the four-party alliance led by the Nepali Congress has refused to participate in the peace process and has announced fresh agitation against what they call ‘regression’. Members of this alliance have been pressing for the restoration of parliament and a consensus government that should initiate dialogue with the rebels. They argue that the new government will command more credibility and legitimacy, and certainly strengthen the government at the time of the talks with the Maoists. Nepali Congress Chief G.P. Koirala has refused to participate or nominate a representative for the high-level peace committee formed on August 12, 2004, under the leadership of the Prime Minister. The objective of the committee is to coordinate the peace process and finalise the political agendas for negotiations. Reports suggest that he is holding a parallel dialogue with the Maoists in order to bring them to the political mainstream.

While there appears to be a broad consensus on negotiating with the Maoists, it, however, cannot be achieved until the political parties bridge their own political differences and evolve an effective negotiating strategy. In the light of this, a pertinent question emerges: does Nepal need external mediation to break the deadlock. Those who favour external mediation argue that despite two rounds of ceasefire and negotiations in 2001 and 2003, the government and the Maoists failed to reach a minimum consensus, hence an impartial body like the UN could play a vital role in facilitating the peace talks. The UN system has, on a number of occasions, expressed its desire facilitate peace talks and has sent special emissaries to explore the possibilities of securing a role. But the government has shown little inclination for any external mediation.

Does India have a role to play in breaking the deadlock? India’s concerns at the stalemate between the Nepalese government and the Maoist insurgents are growing. The geo-strategic position of Nepal, open borders and a history of good relations makes Nepal important in India’s strategic calculations. Internal instability in Nepal will have serious security implications for India. The exploitation of open India-Nepal borders by the Maoists, their deepening linkages with Indian leftwing extremist groups such as the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist (People’s War), the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and the Northeast insurgent groups and the unbridled use of India-Nepal open border for shelter, training, supplies and arms smuggling pose serious security threat to India. Further, there is apprehension that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), active in border areas, could forge links with the Maoists to de-estabilise the region. Therefore, India needs to ensure that its core interests are not hurt in the confrontation between the Deuba government and the Maoists. India has been providing military assistance to Nepal based on assessments that the RNA was the only force capable of keeping the Maoists at bay. India has also taken a number of steps to contain Maoist activities on its soil and strengthen coordinated security strategies on both sides of the border.

Conceding that it may not be possible to defeat the Maoists militarily, it is in India’s interest to ensure that the Maoists should not be able to exploit a divided polity. While supporting the Constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy in Nepal, India has repeatedly emphasised that only the monarchy and Nepal’s democratically elected parties can solve the Maoist problem, provided they work in unison. Towards this end, it is in India’s interest to facilitate a peace process with an aim to restore and strengthen a viable and sustainable democratic government in Nepal.

South Asia Maoist, Nepal Attack on Sheikh Hasina July 2004 Sreeradha Datta

On August 21, 2004, a little before 5.30 in the evening, there was a grenade attack on the Awami League leader, Sheikh Hasina Wajed. This occurred soon after she concluded her speech in a public rally close to the Awami League headquarters in Dhaka, which ironically was held to protest the recent grenade attacks in Sylhet. 11 of the 13 grenades hurled at the rally exploded instantly followed by indiscriminate firing fortunately missing the target, Sheikh Hasina, as she was hurriedly escorted into her bullet-proof car. The impact left 18 dead and hundreds wounded. Committed in broad daylight, the terror attack - the work of ‘experts’- was meticulously planned and executed.

Beginning with the Udichi blast in March 1999, such attacks have become commonplace in Bangladesh - possibly the 20th in as many as 5 years. All the recent attacks have, according to senior investigation officers, used such similar grenades1 as the ARGES 48, which incidentally the Bangladeshi army also uses. The ARGES 48 were originally of Austrian make, but are now widely made in China and other parts of the world. These grenades have been used in the Afghanistan war as well as on the Indian Parliament attack in December 2001. Alarmingly, the stickers found on the unexploded grenades led experts to believe that they could have been locally made. Besides the type of explosives, a distinctive pattern can be discerned in all the recent terror attacks in Bangladesh. First, there is a commonality in the locations. The bomb attacks have always aimed at causing huge casualties by targeting crowded places like cinema halls, cultural gatherings, and especially political rallies (of Awami League). Second, a common thread unites these targets - the allegation that they are by their very nature, ‘un-islamic.’2 Moreover, people from different walks of life but with a common secular orientation have been targeted over the last few years. These attacks can thus be distinguished from criminal acts of violence because of the nature of targets selected. The targeted ones have ranged from common people, to high-profile personalities such as the British High Commissioner, the Mayor of Sylhet, Awami League leaders like Sheikh Hasina, Suranjit Sengupta and others.3 Given the category of people being targeted, it has not gone amiss or unnoticed that neither any BNP leaders nor other alliance party leaders have ever been the targets of such attacks.

Furthermore, each time a blast has occurred, it has been a common practice for the BNP to suggest that it was orchestrated by the Awami League to deliberately sully the image of Bangladesh. The inability of the Bangladeshi leaders to rise above personal differences and evolve larger national policies has resulted in a failure to rein in terror. Vital national issues like the deterioration of law and order and the rise of religious extremism have invariably been hostage to the Hasina- Khaleda personal duel. Given the overarching role that personality clashes and personal enmity play in Bangladeshi domestic politics, the political parties of Bangladesh - especially the Awami League and the BNP - are not able to offer any objective opinion or reaction in times of such crises. Likewise, even when Sheikh Hasina was attacked as a Prime Minister, Opposition leader Begum Khaleda had accused the government of deliberately maligning the image of Bangladesh. Similarly, for the Awami League, every attack is interpreted as the inevitable fallout of ‘Talibanisation’ of Bangladesh that has been taking place over the years.

The spectre of Talibanisation in Bangladesh was first identified during the visit of the US President Bill Clinton in October 2000. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had insisted on canceling the President’s visit to the National Memorial in Savar on the outskirts of Dhaka in view of the threats arising out of the presence of religious extremist elements. This issue soon gathered momentum especially during the October 2001 Jatiya Sangsad elections. Media reports in Bangladesh suggested that the Islamic parties, especially Jama’at-e-Islami, had taken advantage of Bangladeshi Taliban activists who came home from Afghanistan following the US military offensive. The formation of the new government with Jama’at-e-Islami as a key partner did not relegate the question of the Taliban-Al Qaida presence in Bangladesh to the background. The leader of Opposition, Sheikh Hasina, began using the bogey of Talibanisation for delegitimising the Begum Khaleda government and the international media also started highlighting Al Qaida presence in Bangladesh. Beginning with the first terror attack on March 6, 1999, Sheikh Hasina has accused the BNP as well as its right-wing political allies of condoning and encouraging external militant and terrorist groups inside the country. Given the escalation of terror and violence in the last four years, the Opposition parties, especially the Awami League, have reiterated their accusations against the BNP alliance government of turning a blind eye to the growing presence of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh.

Despite the professed secular commitments, Bangladesh has not been immune to religious extremism. A number of recent developments and incidents suggest that mounting religious extremism could feed and intensify socio-political tensions. Taliban’s growing influence in Bangladesh was reflected in the street demonstrations and protest rallies organised by religious activists disapproving of the governments pledge to be a partner of the US global war against terror. Since then, especially last year, there have been numerous such incidents indicative of the growing intolerance in Bangladesh. In fact, the last three similar bomb attacks, prior to the recent one, have been at Sylhet of which two have taken place at the Sufi shrine of Hazrat Shahjalal.

  • The first such attack in the month of January 2004 was timed soon after the departure of the Jamaat leader Saidi who criticised the Sylhetis for revering the local Sufi shrine. The next attack at the same place occurred during a visit of the Bangladesh-born British High Commissioner, Anwar Choudhury.
  • The religious intolerance is highly marked in the light of the recent escalations in attacks on minorities including churchgoers, Hindus as well as the Ahmadiyas. There is a growing belief that the government’s indifferent attitude towards the demands by Islamic groups to declare Ahmadiya as non-Muslims has encouraged them to go ahead with an even more assertive militant agenda.
  • Emergence of a militant group Jagrato Muslim Jatiya Bangladesh (JMJB) in the northwestern region is another example of the growing sway of Islamic militancy. The local police and administration are unable to prevent this group, which has been holding people to ransom and demanding implementation of Sharia law all over Bangladesh.
  • Following a report in a national vernacular daily, Prothom Alo on the terrorist activity in Chittagong and its unregistered madrasas, the Kowmi madrasa teachers and students of Chittagong have demanded the arrest of the publisher of Prothom Alo and the closure of the magazine.
  • Death threats are being issued against an increasingly large number of secular-minded political personalities and even journalists.

These developments indicate that under continuous pressure from the fundamentalists, the BNP-led government will gradually concede space on religious issues like the imposition of Sharia and the introduction of Islamic code of conduct in public life. Thus, the right-wing forces may assert enormous influence in Bangladeshi internal politics and plunge the state into domestic turmoil, especially when the main political parties are clearly undecided about the strategies they would evolve to handle such a menace.

What is further distressing is the complete failure of the judicial system in Bangladesh, for it has chosen to act as a handmaiden of the party in power. Not surprisingly, despite the devastating blasts no investigation or probe has ever been complete or made public so far. In fact, beyond the rudimentary attempts to accuse and arrest the Opposition leaders, that too without evidence, very few have actually been held responsible for any of the acts of terror. Further, the present BNP-led government is adding to the confidence of the right-wing chauvinists by denying the existence of any Islamic militant groups and thus it might be unwittingly nurturing a Frankenstein’s monster by refusing to acknowledge the malignancy of this malady.

As argued earlier, while Jamaat-e-Islami may not have been directly behind the attacks,4 its stand on the issue of Islamic assertion has given strength to the fringe groups. Even if these forces represent a small number at the moment, they are unmistakably expanding their area of influence and becoming increasingly vocal and daring in their attacks. This largely occurs because the two main political parties remain locked in a game of one-upmanship and vital national security issues are invariably overlooked. In fact, immediately after the August 21 attack a relatively unknown group Hikmatul Zihad5 claimed responsibility for it and vowed to achieve its goal within the next few days. However, there has been no comment from the media or official sources on this front. According to an Indian report, a meeting called by a group of Islamic militant was attended by members of the Harkat-ul Jiahad Al Islam (HUJAI) as well as a senior BNP leader to plan the August 21 attack on Shiekh Hasina.6

The recent grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina has provided the Opposition ammunition to reiterate the demand for the present alliance to quit. Despite a month-long programme that ended recently, the Opposition forces were unable to muster adequate strength to bring about the dismissal of the BNP alliance government. A renewed attempt has been made once again by the Awami League, the 11-Left Party alliance and the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal led by Hasanul Haq Inu.7 Although the government agreed to use the services of the Interpol for investigation into the case, the Opposition further argued that an impartial and fair investigation was not possible without the ouster of the BNP ruling collation. Further, internal dissensions have emerged within the BNP-led alliance. Naziur Rahman Manzur of the Bangladesh Jatiya Party and Mufti Fazlul Huque Amini, Chairman of the Islami Oikya Jote - both alliance partners - have criticised the government for its failure to arrest any attacker. Given the serious charges that are being leveled at Jamaat and its linkages with the Islamic militant groups, domestic pressure has been building up on Khaleda Zia to drop them from the cabinet.

Bangladesh largely comprises of a secular and culturally conscious people who would not allow Islamic radicals to hold the country to ransom. But keeping the extremist forces under control would also necessitate the cooperation of the BNP and the Awami League. Only a concerted effort from all quarters will help rein in terror and violence, which has been heightened by the free flow of small arms.

References/End Notes

  • 1. Are Sylhet and Dhaka Bomb Attacks of Same Module? Prothom Alo. August 24, 2004. (Author’s translation)
  • 2. Bomb Carnage in Bangladesh:. All Victims are Secular. The Daily Star. August 29, 2004.
  • 3. It Was an Attempt to Kill Our Democracy . The Daily Star. August 24, 2004.
  • 4. http://www.asiapacificms.com/articles/bangladesh_extremismdownloaded on 8/ 302003.
  • 5. Hikmatul Zihad Vows to Kill Hasina in a Week. The Daily Star.August 25, 2004.
  • 6. Bangladesh Calls Hartal Again Today, Ananda Bazaar Patrika (Bengali) August 30, 2004. (Author’s translation)
  • 7. Quit Immediately. The Daily Star. August 30, 2004.
South Asia Al Qaeda, Pakistan, Terrorism, Taliban The 9/11 Report: Reaffirming Pakistan-Terrorism Nexus July 2004 Parama Sinha Palit

The 585-page National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Report that investigated the plot, design and circumstances leading to the 9/11 attacks on the US has highlighted the dangers of organised terrorism in threatening global peace and security. The same threat has been reiterated in the recent Beslan tragedy in Russia. It is clear that terrorism has acquired global dimensions and has emerged as a fundamental concern for the international community. This commentary focuses upon the salient findings of the Report with particular emphasis on Pakistan’s role in fostering terrorism.

Major Findings

The Report throws considerable light on Pakistan’s link with terrorism. Its major findings in this regard are as follows:

  • The Report has pointed to the involvement of Pakistan with the Al Qaida: ‘Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after 9/11, although it was harbouring bin Laden’.1
  • It also asserts that Pakistan benefited from the Taliban-Al Qaida relationship as Osama Bin Laden’s camps trained fighters for ‘Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with India over Kashmir’.2
  • The 9/11 Report can be further corroborated by another ‘stunning document’ of Pakistani origin. Based on the ‘document’, Arnaud de Borchgrave states: “the imprints of every major act of international Islamist terrorism invariably passes through Pakistan, right from 9/11- where virtually all the participants had trained, resided or met in, coordinated with, or received funding from or through Pakistan”.3 Apart from the Pakistani factor, the Report brings out other weaknesses that briefly need to be highlighted:
  • It holds North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is responsible for defending the nations’ airspace, as negligent, since it had ‘no indication of a hijack heading to Washington D.C. at this time’ (10.07 hours).4 The NORAD was unable to share information quickly or coherently as the attack unfolded during the day. The Langley F-16 pilots were never briefed about the reasons behind their being commissioned at a sudden notice. As the lead pilot later explained, “I reverted to the Russian threat, I’m thinking cruise missile threat from the sea…”5 The pilots knew their mission was to identify and divert aircraft flying within a certain radius of Washington, but they did not know that the threat was actually from hijacked commercial airliners.6
  • The Report also mentions the inability of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation as of September 11, 2001, to have a close interaction with the other federal agency, NORAD during the crisis since the communication system were close to collapse after the attack.
  • According to the Report, the breakdown in the chain of command also proved catastrophic with simple orders not getting passed like Vice President’s orders to shoot down the aircrafts before they hit their targets- “the Vice President was mistaken in his belief that shoot down authorisation has been passed to the pilots flying at NORAD’s direction”7, states the Report.

Significantly, the Report exposes the Al Qaida-Iran connection while negating the Iraq-Al Qaida link.

  • “No credible evidence” was found of any operational link between Iraq and Al Qaida. The finding challenges President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney’s recent assertions that the Iraqi leader had “longestablished ties” to the group8 (Al Qaida), and hence the war against Iraq. The conclusion has prompted John Kerry, the Democratic Presidential nominee, to accuse President Bush of ‘misleading’ the American people.
  • The Report has gathered extensive evidence of ties between Al Qaida and the fundamentalist Islamic leaders of Iran indicating Al Qaida’s links the world over. The Report points out:

On June 26, 1996, an explosion ripped through a building in the Khober towers apartment complex housing the US Airforce personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia… Subsequent investigation concluded that the attack had been carried out by a single Saudi Shia Hezbollah group with assistance from Iran. Intelligence obtained shortly after the bombing, however, also supported suspicions of Bin-Laden’s involvement. (emphasis added)

Impact of the Report

The following analysis attempts to understand whether or not the Commission’s findings will have serious impacts upon the domestic as well as the foreign policies of the US.

  • The Commission’s Report is unlikely to influence the forthcoming Presidential elections in November. President Bush, the Republican nominee is trumpeting his fight against global terrorism by stating time and again that “we will build a safer world and a more hopeful America, and nothing will hold us back”.9 He is also gaining in popularity ratings (though by a narrow margin)10 despite the fact that the Al Qaida has regrouped itself and authoritarian regimes around the world are already feeling empowered.
  • The 9/11 Report has prescribed no new strategy for dealing with Pakistan. Instead, the US has granted Pakistan the status of a major non-NATO ally (MNNA)11 in league with countries like Argentina, South Korea, Israel, Australia, Japan, despite the country being indicted in the Report. India has quite rightly not raked the issue over Pakistan being elevated to the status of a more ‘privileged’ ally (in terms of greater security and military relations), notwithstanding the undisputed support which Pakistan has provided to Al Qaida, as brought out by the Report. However, it is possible that India might be forced to review its contribution to the initiatives on ‘counter-terrorism’ in the light of the dubious duplicity being pursued by the US.
  • While remaining taciturn on the Commission’s Report, Musharraf is being cautious in fulfilling his commitments to the US-led ‘global war against terrorism’. Washington will definitely construe the killing of Naik Mohammad - the renegade tribal militant and former Taliban commander - by the Pakistani army, as well as other Taliban leaders held captive by the Pakistani government as positive exploits.
  • The Report is unlikely to have any bearing on Musharraf’s already evolved Kashmir policy and the US think-tank community will continue to believe that Washington should seek ‘to promote and facilitate’ dialogue and peace process between the two South Asian countries - India and Pakistan.
  • Interestingly, while the 9/11 Report implicates Pakistan for its links with terrorist outfits, it also calls for a greater US aid to Pakistan in areas of economy and military. The Report, in fact, further advances the US’ ambivalence towards Pakistan. It underlines:

Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support the Pakistan government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own. 12

With respect to Iran, the Report might add to the current debate within the Bush Administration (between the neo-cons and the realists) whether or not to up the ante against Iran. The Report, which stresses the link between Al Qaida and Iran instead of Iraq, can further alienate the ‘neo-cons’ from the ‘realists’ with respect to Iran. A Task Force “Iran: Time for a New Approach” chaired by the former National Security Adviser to President Carter (1977-81), Zbigniew Brzenzinski, who represents the realists, argues that the neo-conservatives prodding Washington to pursue ‘regime change’ in Iran are underestimating the Khatami government.13 It is not clear how ultimately the Bush Administration plans to deal with Iran, one of the constituents of the ‘axis of evil’. Within the Bush Administration, this would also signal whether the neo-cons are on the decline as against the realists.

Conclusion

The 9/11 Report categorically identifies Al Qaida as the perpetrator of the terror attacks on the US. However, the anti-American anger among the Muslims has not abated. A public survey conducted in June 2004 in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and the Unted Arab Emirates, where more than threefourths of the respondents said they believed that the US objectives in Iraq were intended in part to ‘weaken the Muslim world,’14 indicates that there is a ready pool of Muslims willing to participate in Osama Bin Laden’s search for global jihad.

Notwithstanding the links between Pakistan-Al Qaida-terrorism getting reactivated, India-US and India-Pakistan relations are taking strides in the right direction. While Washington and New Delhi have met for the sixth Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism (August-September 2004), India’s Foreign Minister K Natwar Singh met his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in keeping with the spirit of a ‘composite dialogue’ between the two countries. However, on the issue of terrorism, Islamabad’s repeated verbal commitments towards reining468 in terror, whether it is cross-border terrorism or tolerance for militant and jihadi outfits in the country, have not translated into actual performance. Clearly, the US attitude towards Pakistan is still seeped in the past policies of the Cold War years.

Hence, with respect to South Asia, the 9/11 Report does not come up with any significant policy formulation by the US administration. In fact, the Report spells continuation of the US policy towards Pakistan as well as further engagement with Musharraf. In the light of the 9/11 Report and other revelations highlighting Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism, India and the US are unlikely to converge to a shared perception for resolving the challenge of terrorism, given Pakistan’s strategic value to the US.

References/End Notes

  • 1. The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Executive Summary. p.7.
  • 2. Ibid
  • 3. “Pakistan Treating bin Laden for Kidney Disease”. July 25, 2004 at http:// davinci.dilykos.com/story/2004/7/25/164937/572
  • 4. “Improvising A Homeland Defense”. Staff Statement no.17. p.26 at http://www.9- 11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_15.pdf
  • 5. no.1, p.28
  • 6. Ibid
  • 7. no. 5
  • 8. Lobe, Jim, “9/11 Panel Challenges Bush on Al Qaeda-Iraq Links” at http:// ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=24232
  • 9. Bush Outlines Plan for a 2nd Term and Attacks Kerry’s Record. September 3, 2004 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/03/politics/campaign/03convene.html?hp=&p...
  • 10. “President Bush: Job Ratings”. September 9-10, 2004 at http://www.pollin greport.com/BushJob.htm
  • 11. “Pakistan Welcomes Major Non-NATO Ally Status”. June 18, 2004 at http:// paknews.com/PrintPage.php?id=1&date1=2004-06-18&news=top1
  • 12. “US Told to Step-up Aid to Pakistan as a Part of Global Anti-terror Strategy”. July 23, 2004, at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20040723/wl_sthasia_a...
  • 13. Lobe, Jim, “Realists and Neo-Cons Renew Battle on Iran” at http://ipsnews.net/ interna.asp?idnews=24706
  • 14. Telhami, Shibley, “Al Qaeda on Course”. The Baltimore Sun. July 18, 2004 at http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/telhami/20040718.htm
Nuclear and Arms Control Al Qaeda, Global War on Terror (GWOT), Pakistan, Terrorism, United States of America (USA) Import of 9/11 Against Beslan Backdrop July 2004 C Uday Bhaskar

Beslan, till recently an unknown small town in Russia, has become the latest ‘victim-symbol’ in the global pattern of terrorist violence. The manner in which innocent young children were slaughtered on September 3 marks a reprehensible low even by the standards of the terrorist. The death toll at the time of writing this comment is in excess of 350 and still climbing. The shocking and gruesome Beslan images that repeatedly screamed across millions of television screens the world over were reminiscent of the enormity of 9/11 three years ago. September has been doubly bloody and cruel for the former Cold War adversaries. September 3-9 will be etched on the Russian psyche in much the same manner that 9/11 has indelibly scarred the US consciousness.

In an unintended but ironic twist to the vagaries of history, President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia is at war after Beslan, while only a few days earlier on September 1, US President George W. Bush in a NBC “Today” programme in reply to a question about the war against terrorism conceded: “I don’t think you can win it. But I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world.”

Given the compulsions of the US Presidential elections in November, Bush was quick to retract his NBC statement adding that luckily he was inarticulate. Reiterating that what he meant was something else, he asserted that the war against terrorism would be waged relentlessly and that it would be won - with Bush at helm of US affairs and by extension global affairs. In short, both the former superpowers of the Cold War vintage now have Presidents of a democratic dispensation who have cast themselves in the mould of the steely, indefatigable Commander-in-Chief in this phase of the war against terrorism - the big T that has entered the global security lexicon even as the twin towers collapsed on millions of television screens three years ago.

The import of 9/11 is complex, contradictory and dynamic. Many strands are tangible and linear while others are intangible and such non-linear perception will be comprehended with the passage of time, for we are still too close to it. However, some inferences and paradigmatic shifts are discernible three years down the road. At the macro-strategic level, state as an entity - whether it is the US at one end of the spectrum or Nepal at the other (that inadvertently became the victim of the fall-out of 9/11 when Nepalese hostages were killed in Iraq by a group of abductors) - have now become more insecure and an inchoate uncertainty grips those responsible for state and societal security.

Thus the first big transmutation that has taken place is in the mutation of state DNA apropos the concept of security. The long cycle of history that has been telescoped in recent decades with the advent of relentless technological modernity is witnessing a transformation in the way in which states see themselves and their interpretation and prioritisation of security. The colonial period of modern history that began with Vasco de Gama in 1498 and ended notionally with the end of the Second World War and Hiroshima saw the emergence of the classical nationstate wherein states were occupied in preserving and defending their territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It was axiomatic that the citizen would be safe and secure within these parameters.

This was also the beginning of the 46-year long anomalous phase of the Cold War and the nation-state was quickly divided into blocks identified by their corelation to the undercurrents of bi-polarity. The nation-state was supreme in the security discourse, though ironically the seeds of the emergence of the non-state actor and religious zealotry were sown in the Afghan war of the early 1980s by the erstwhile superpowers. The nuclear weapon lashed to a frighteningly accurate and lethal missile became the symbol of major power security contestation, but the winds of change were astutely recognised by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. The Cold War ended in the most unlikely manner notwithstanding the irrational doctrinal commitment to mutually assured destruction and the image that is abiding is of a defiant Boris Yeltsin standing atop a Soviet tank.

The post-Cold War period was brief - from 1991 to 2001 (9/11) - but the euphoria it generated was intense. History, it was averred, had ended for there was little to contest and the free-market and normative liberal values were deified at the twin altars of consumption and profit cocooned in the IT bubble. The marketstate was born and for a heady moment, Bill Gates became more important than Bill Clinton. The centrality and efficacy of the state in the production and distribution of the concept of security was questioned and venerable pundits heralded the onset of a golden period in global history when finally the Cold War swords would be turned to bio-tech ploughshares. Borders it was averred had become passé and the global citizen armed with a laptop wafted atop the IT balloon, as it was carried upward forever (?) by Fukuyama and a booming stock market.

However, 9/11 dramatically and tragically punctured this nascent bubble of euphoria. The world as we knew it would never be the same and in the three years what we now witness as part of the mutation of state DNA is the emergence of the besieged-fortress-state and a bewildered and angry citizenry. Beslan is only the most recent example of what may follow in this trail of violence, bloodshed and anguish.

To compound the complexity of the 9/11 spoor, states more often than not respond predictably. Military force is invoked - as was the case with the US and now Russia - and the spiral will follow the melancholia of the Yeatsian gyre. The ‘other’ is demonised in the post 9/11 security discourse and hence the Muslim becomes suspect in the West and the Chechen now in Russia. The American death toll in Iraq has crossed the 1,000 mark despite ‘victory’ having been triumphantly declared in Iraq and the determined insurgency is veering towards a nationalist movement. In the proximate vicinity, notwithstanding the elections in early October, Afghanistan seems more and more likely to slip into fiercely contested enclaves with the Taliban and their supporters back in circulation. In short, the neat military resolution that installs the ‘good guys’ while the US can ride into the sunset with a sense of moral satisfaction appears elusive.

At the domain of the global systemic, where states are located in their inevitable jostling in the furtherance of individual national interest, one may posit that the brief unipolar moment is now past. The US as the exemplar of the West that had won the Cold War is now besieged by its own anxieties from both within and without. Its pre-eminence as the world’s most potent military power is not in doubt. Its ability to stay the course and pump in more resources - both human and material - in the war against terror is also not in doubt. But in an unintended asymmetry, the post-9/11/post-Iraq war domain pits state against non-state and pre-eminent military power embodied in the US state is repeatedly contested by the determined terrorist/ insurgent/nationalist in Iraq and beyond. From all accounts, over-whelming, standoff, hi-tech conventional military power has reached a glass ceiling as the attacks in Falluja and Najaf have demonstrated.

Society is already paying a price for the post 9/11 fallout. The rhythms of normalcy whether within the US or Russia have been irrevocably disturbed and the socio-political ozone layer has been punctured. At one level the terrorist has prevailed for the response of the besieged fortress state has been to accord unto itself the role of ensuring the ‘security’ if its citizenry - at whatever cost. Consequently, the normative liberal values that are embodied in the US Constitution (and other liberal democratic states) now stand trampled or shrunk against the ever-widening police ambit of the state machinery. The imposing military machine at the command of the C-in-C appears formidable but ineffective in the inchoate post-9/11 security landscape. And civil society alas, is becoming increasingly inured to the macabre rhythms of the post-9/11 world as it surfs from wardrobe dysfunction to the Olympics, maybe Darfur and the US Presidential elections - and occasionally stopping at Beslan.

Terrorism & Internal Security Russia, United States of America (USA) Kurt M Campbell et. al., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices July 2004 R. R. Subramanian

The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.

Edited by Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss. The Brookings Institution Press. Washington D.C. 2004. 367 p. Price not available. ISBN: 0-8157-1331-2.

The US has always been at the forefront of the crusade against nuclear weapons proliferation. This crusade has been arrested by the 9/11 events wherein the present Republican administration has had to suddenly contend with the global war against terrorism. The Democratic Party is a strong advocate of nuclear non-proliferation and its nominee for president, John Kerry is no exception. If he were to defeat George W. Bush in the Presidential elections in November this year, the US policy on nuclear non-proliferation might undergo a major shift in view of the perceived connection between nuclear weapons and terrorism.

The present volume is innovative in that it tackles a hitherto not conceived idea - the breakout of non-‘rogue’ states from the NPT system. The mere fact that a liberal think-tank like the Brookings Institution has chosen to publish a policy study of a conservative think-tank like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) approach to nuclear weapons proliferation suggests that a new agenda for arms control especially nuclear non-proliferation is sought to be fostered through bipartisan consensus. The three authors - Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss - have served in major capacities in the US government and their collaboration has enabled them to marshall the services of several eminent academics like Jonathan Pollack, formerly of the RAND Corporation and former Assistant Secretary of Defence, Walter B. Slocombe.

In the past, thinking in the US non-proliferation circles concentrated on ‘countries of concern’ like Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya for their clandestine development of nuclear weapons even though they are signatories to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon status. In the present volume, only Syria falls in that category.

To perceive of a reconsideration of nuclear choices by staunch friends and allies of the US vindicates India’s position that the NPT is fatally flawed and needs recasting. Unfortunately, American thinking continues to adhere to the core edifice of the NPT system. The present volume is no exception; it seeks deterrence of states that might contemplate a breakout from the NPT. The Bush Administration’s neo-conservative group is obsessed with global terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. It has paid lip service to arms control and nuclear non-proliferation in general but this could change if Bush were to be re-elected.

The present volume examines the nuclear calculations involved in eight countries - Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Of late, the IAEA has voiced concerns about South Korea developing the very select technology of laser isotope separation of uranium.

Interestingly, the case studies relate to states that have all signed the NPT like Iran, Iraq and North Korea but have been suspected of trying to develop nuclear weapons. Iraq’s nuclear weapons were decimated during the Gulf War of 1991 but Iran is perceived as being perilously close to developing at least six nuclear weapons according to Israeli intelligence sources. This would have dire consequences on its neighbours, the Sunni majority Saudi Arabia and Syria. The proliferation by purchase path, they are perceived to contemplate, may destabilise the Arab world, as Israel is presently the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in West Asia. Egypt, as the acknowledged political, cultural and economic leader of the Arab World, has, since Anwar Sadat, maintained friendly ties with Israel. Robert Einhorn with his considerable experience in the Clinton administration analyses why Egypt may choose to gravitate to nuclear status. Ellen Laipson seeks to analyse how nuclear weapons with Syria may improve its precarious security.

Jenifer Mackby and Walter. B. Slocombe trace how Germany as the potential proliferator of the 1950s and 1960s, has now reached the status of the least likely candidate that will proliferate in this century. Similar arguments could hold in the case of Japan so long as the US-Japan security alliance holds.

Kurt Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara have traced rather convincingly Japan’s ‘thinking of the unthinkable’. The chapter by Kurt M. Campbell entitled “Reconsidering a Nuclear Future: Why Countries Might Cross Over to the Other Side” is thought-provoking in that it puts into perspective what one has hitherto not found in the conventional analysis of nuclear non-proliferation. To quote: “For nearly half a century, a central aspect of the US diplomacy and national security strategy has been to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Over the last decade, this pursuit has focused primarily on stopping unsavoury regimes such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq from acquiring or developing nuclear capability… yet for all the attention given to these usual suspects, there has been remarkably little consideration of another class of future potential proliferators: those states that in the past chose to forgo the nuclear option…”

In this category, according to the author, are countries like Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan and Turkey. Except for the fact that Germany and Japan attempted to build nuclear weapons during the Second World War, there is little to suggest that these vanquished countries, who have become economic giants, would flirt with nuclear weapons so long as the US security alliance remains in force.

As far as South Korea is concerned, its motivation could be North Korea’s brazen violation of NPT norms. However, the US security alliance would restrain Seoul’s attempts in spite of recent reports to the contrary. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are Islamic countries that have different attitudes to the only nuclear state in West Asia - Israel. Turkey, an ally of France, is keen to enter the European Union and is unlikely to ruffle the feathers of the Western alliance. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are bedevilled by Islamic fundamentalism and closely tied to the United States. That leaves Syria, which has deep resentment towards Israel.

How far Russia, a close ally of Syria, would tolerate Syria’s flirtation with nuclear weapons warrants further analysis. An interesting quote by Thomas W. Lippman in his essays on Saudi Arabia merits attention, wherein Osama bin Laden is reported to have said: “it is the duty of Muslims to possess these weapons.” In view of the fact that Saudi Arabia’s ally, Pakistan, has these weapons, and Iran is attempting to procure these weapons, bin Laden’s assertion need to be examined further.

The essays in this volume are unique and forthright in that they cast aspersions on the very stability of the non-proliferation regime. The case studies of countries that have been rather closely tied to the Western countries except for Syria are thought provoking. The study on Taiwan merits immediate consideration because of its permanent conflict with its neighbour China, across the Straits. If China were to contemplate immediate military action in the event of an ideological crisis, Taiwan might have to resort to nuclear weapon use in a ‘last resort’ mode a la Israel. Derek J. Mitchell’s study in the volume entitled, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence Abandonment and Honour” is a very timely one. He has forcefully brought out the fact that if the US had not intervened in the early 1980s, Taiwan might well have gone nuclear. In that period, Israel, South Africa and Taiwan were characterised as ‘pariah’ states. They had actively collaborated in the development of nuclear weapons with the tacit support of the US.

In their concluding essay, Kurt Campbell and Robert Einhorn have aptly observed that there may be no urgency with regard to these states ‘tipping out’ of the NPT and developing nuclear weapons. The study, however, could have been more convincing if it were to have suggested what political factors could motivate these states to opt out of the US-sponsored alliances and seek an independent nuclear deterrence.

However, nuclear non-proliferation has to be recast in the light of the major advances that technology has caused. For instance, laser isotope separation, presently confined to countries like the US, Israel and China, has found its way into South Korea. As a result, South Korea could make a mockery of CTBT by separating weapons grade plutonium from reactor grade. Also, the United States could choose to selectively proliferate in countries like Turkey, to arrest the threat of Iran, especially in Central Asia.

One of the major lacunae in this study has been to perpetuate the theological perceptions of the US Congress and the Democratic Party, that states closely tied to the US save for Syria, have independent security perspectives. One then wonders if countries like India who have challenged the NPT edifice do not also have the right to their nuclear weapons and independently enhance their security vis-à-vis recalcitrant neighbours.

Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy Sreeradha Datta

Publishers: IDSA and Shipra

ISBN: 81-7541-165-1

Rs 395

US $ 30

About the Book

The decade long democratic experiment in Bangladesh has its ups and downs. The transparent electoral process administered through a neutral caretaker government and the smooth transfer of power has not improved internal instability and political maturity. Without ignoring the democratic accomplishments since 1991, "Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy" seeks to highlight the turbulence sweeping through this new nation. The book argues that the highly personalised nature of Bangladesh politics and the personal animosity between Begum Khaleda and Sheikh Hasina have weakened the democratisation process. Moreover, the resurgence of Islam as the primordial identity of Bangladesh and the wave of violence against minorities as well as the rise of religious extremism, pose a serious challenge to the consolidation of democracy in Bangladesh.

About the Author

Dr Sreeradha Datta is an Associate Fellow with IDSA. She has a Ph D in International Organisation, from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her areas of specialisation have been India's Northeast and Bangladesh.

Contents

Preface,
Introduction
National Identity: Religion versus Culture
Islamisation & Dangers of Extremism
Conclusion

Election Politics: The Legitimacy Debate
Coalition Politics & Political Opportunism,
Electoral Mechanism,
Coalition Politics,
Elections 2001,
Electoral Trends

Faltering Democracy: the Teething Problems
Clash of Personalities,
Political Irresponsibility,
Caretakes Government,
Erosion of Parliament,
Executive over-reach,
Weakening Social Cohesion

The Minorities: Hindus and Chakmas
Sense of insecurity,
Influx into India,
Political Rivalries,
Islamisation of Bangladesh,
Structural Handicaps,
Implications,
The Chakma Problem,
Background, Chakma Influxes,
The Chakma Problem,
Prelude to the Accord,
The Accord,
Evaluation of the Accord

Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Impediments for Improvement
Trade,
Borders,
Ganges
Water Sharing,
Migration,
Insurgency,
Al-Quidaa Controversy,
Gas Politics

Prognosis : Islamisation, Lack of Democratic Culture

Bibliography, Index

South Asia system/files/files/images/book_bangladeshafragile.jpg Russia China Relations: Relevance for India Jyotsna Bakshi

Publishers: IDSA and Shipra

ISBN: 81-7541-189-9

Rs 650

US $ 55

About the Book

The relations between Russia and China - one of the largest state in the world from point of view of territory and the other from point of view of population - have always impacted on the course of the global and regional geopolitics. No wonder, the course of Sino-Soviet relations has always evoked keen interest in the major capitals of the world. From the Indian perspectives, the study of Sino-Russian relations and their implications for India is of particular importance. India, Russia and China are the three largest countries of the Eurasian continent. Moscow-Beijing relationship at any given point of time - whether cooperative or antagonistic - has always tended to have profound implications for Indian policy towards both.

The narrative of Russia China relations in the present book focuses on the contemporary post-Soviet period. Beset by numerous domestic problems and external challenges, new Russia has sought to follow a 'balanced' policy towards the West as well as the East in a bid to create a conductive environment for the economic and military revival of the country. Indeed, both Moscow and Beijing have sought to improve their bilateral ties in the post-Cold War period without constraining the freedom of the sides in the pursuit of a flexible, multi-vector policy.

The central thrust as well as intricacies and nuances of Russia-China discourse are viewed in this volume against canvas of the regional and world geopolitics. The relevance for India is analysed and interwoven in the narrative.

About the Author

Dr. Jyotsna Bakshi, a Research Fellow at the IDSA from August 1997 to April 2002, specializes in Russia and Central Asia. The Indian Council of Social Sciences Research awarded her Doctoral Fellowship for Ph.D. She has taught Political Science to Post-Graduate classes for a number of years. She has also done post-doctoral research work at the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics, Panjab University, Chandigarh . Currently she is working as ICCR Visiting Associate Professor at Osh State University, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.

She has published many research papers and articles on the subject besides a book Russia and India from Ideology to Geopolitics

Contents

Acknowledgement
Preface
The Soviet Legacy
The Yeltsin Years
President Putin's Russia and China
The Boundary Agreement
The Military-Technical Cooperation
Russia and China in Central Asia: Partnership or Rivarly?
Conclusion
Appendices
I. Text of Shanghai Five Agreement, (April 26, 1996)
II. Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (July 16, 2001)
III. Declaration by the heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (June 7, 2002)

Bibliography

Index

East Asia, Europe and Eurasia system/files/files/images/book_russiachinarelations.jpg India and Central Asia: Advancing the Common Interest Ramakant Dwivedi, K. Santhanam

Publishers: IDSA and Anamaya

ISBN: 81-88342-27-0

Rs. 650.00

Contributed articles presented at 3rd India-Central Asia Regional Conference held on Nov. 6-8, 2003 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on understanding of security environment in Central Asia and India's perceptions on better cooperation in politico-economic-security issues faced in the region.

Europe and Eurasia The Northeast Complexities and its Determinants Sreeradha Datta

Publishers: IDSA and Shipra

ISBN: 81-7541-187-2

Rs 350

US $ 35

About the Book

Even after fifty years, India's Northeast continues to draw national attention for all the many reasons. The intensification of ethnic differences poses significant security challenges for India. Taking a holistic approach, the book examines the roots of the turmoil in the region, the inadequate economic development as a contri- buting factor as well as the regional implications of the protracted violence and instability.

The book also highlights the role of external forces in accentuating the situation and the linkages that some of the militant groups in this region have managed to forge and thrive on. The book may be found useful for policy makers and scholars interested in this region of northeast region of India.

About the Author

Sreeradha Datta is Associate Fellow at Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. During the past few years, she has been studying, specialising and commenting on the turmoil in India's Northeastern states. Gradually, she has expanded her focus and has been analysing the domestic political dynamics in Bangladesh

Contents

Preface
Introduction
Ethnic Dimensions of Northeast Turmoil
Economic Problems
Concessions and Aid
The Regional Environment and External Linkages
External Intelligence Agencies and Northeast
National Response
Tables
Some Basic data of North-east
Nexus
Number of Investment intentions for Northeast and some other state of India Bibliography
Select Bibliography
Index

Terrorism & Internal Security system/files/files/images/book_thenortheastcomplexiti.jpg
Publication | Page 657 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

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